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In this study we aim to understand how GitHub is 
used by COVID-19 interest groups for organizing 
community archives to protect their knowledge from the 
Chinese government’s censorship efforts. We introduce 
two case studies of such COVID-19 community archives 
published with GitHub that appeared online in early 
2020. Using public GitHub repository documentation 
and web archive web crawls from the Internet Archive’s 
Wayback Machine, we describe how these digital 
community archives emerge and exist on the platform, 
how knowledge of them circulated on other US based 
social media sites and show strategies and tactics these 
volunteers used to keep these community archives alive, 
resist censorship, and guard the safety of these 
collections. We argue that these COVID-19 community 
archives are at risk because of their platform 
accessibility as much as the content they document, and 
that understanding how organizers use GitHub’s 
platform affordances is essential to theorizing how 
platforms are impacting approaches to preserving 
cultural memory.  
1. Introduction  
Since the beginning of the COVID-19 outbreak in 
December of 2019, people all over the world have been 
using online platforms, mobile phone apps, and social 
media to share documents, health information, and 
personal experiences about the pandemic’s trajectory. 
Shortly after the impact of coronavirus became known, 
researchers began to observe the spread of rumors, 
health misinformation, conflicting reports, hoaxes and 
inaccurate data across the web [1]. Public health 
researchers and epidemiologists began to call for 
increased access to public health data, vetted sources, 
and more peer reviewed research. Legislators and policy 
makers began to turn towards the scourge that health 
misinformation on platforms can cause in fomenting a 
public health crisis and demanded that platforms make 
more efforts to moderate. Information researchers, 
historians, journalists and archivists began to call for 
digital archiving efforts to document this moment and 
ask, in an age of platforms and the aftermath of the crisis 
how will we remember this infodemic [2], [3]? The 
research reported in this paper responds to these calls, 
by examining how communities of volunteers have used 
GitHub to create community archives to, in their own 
words, remember COVID-19.  
In February 2020, activists and journalists began 
sharing links on social media platforms like Twitter and 
WeChat to community archive projects coming from 
China [4], [5]. A handful of community archive projects 
organized by Chinese citizens had quickly emerged, 
attempting to preserve news stories, personal narratives, 
and first-hand accounts of the novel coronavirus 
outbreak, anticipating that they would likely be removed 
from the Internet by Chinese government censors. Some 
of these documentation projects use GitHub, a US-based 
platform that allows teams to collaborate, share software 
projects and documentation, collaborate with code, and 
create repositories of information for people to access 
multiple versions of repositories as projects are 
developed [6]. 
Groups of Chinese volunteers started repositories 
(known as “repos”) to create collections of documents, 
solicit contributions, and coordinate the translation of 
first-hand accounts of the pandemic. Initially, GitHub 
appeared to be used by volunteers in order  to evade state 
censorship efforts at blocking citizens’ accounts of the 
pandemic from spreading online but many of these 
repos have since been taken down, gone private, have 
been “404’d” and are no longer accessible on the live 
web. While many of the surviving community archive 
projects risk being scrubbed from the Internet by 
Chinese government censors, it is instructive for 
researchers of critical and ethical perspectives of digital 
social media to consider how organizers use, subvert, 
and protect the knowledge that they seek to preserve 
using platforms. GitHub provides observation entry 
points for researchers because the platform strives to 
provide cloud storage, open access and public 





repositories as primary platform features (as well as 
powerful network effects). And like many other 
platforms striving to enter into global markets with 
information infrastructure, GitHub has a history of 
responding to state censorship efforts and takedown 
requests from governments.  
Platforms present themselves as huge barriers to 
digital archiving efforts and remembering the pandemic 
because of the way that data flows are commodified, 
circulate, and remain accessible to users on the Internet 
as public information infrastructure [7]. For example, 
open source investigators find that bearing witness and 
documenting human rights violations are increasingly 
challenged in the face of content moderation policies 
that delete and ban evidence on YouTube [8]. Many 
racial justice activists and scholars have observed that 
social media platforms have become sites where the 
ritualized public mourning and remembering of Black 
lives who have been brutalized and murdered assumes 
content where “death and trauma are continuously re-
inscribed” [9]. Such content that becomes viral and may 
risk desensitizing viewers to the police violence and 
brutality that users who post these images seek to 
critique and draw awareness to.  
These access challenges, among others, such as 
datafication and commodification shape and are shaped 
by contemporary memory practices that spill across 
platforms. We call this the platformization of digital 
cultural memory. Here we draw on scholars who 
theorize the impact of platforms at the juncture of 
digital, economic, and governmental infrastructures 
[10], as a process involving human and non-human 
actors [11], and as a means for critiquing the 
programmability of data from platforms [12]. We  
employ the approach of Langlois et. al  and use 
“disaggregation” to evaluate the functionality and 
implications of platform features as they pertain to 
Github’s publics and archiving efforts [13]. GitHub 
features simultaneously foster and inhibit practices of 
documenting journalistic and personal narratives. 
Cultural memory becomes institutionalized on the 
platform, and platform policies consequently mediate 
long-term accessibility and preservation.  
In this paper we discuss two case studies of 
COVID-19 community archives published using 
GitHub that appear to have encountered Chinese 
censorship efforts in the first few months of 2020. We 
argue that these community archives are at risk because 
of their accessibility as much as their content, but that 
understanding how organizers use GitHub’s platform 
affordances is essential to theorizing how platforms are 
shifting the concerns of digital preservation from 
storage to ensuring long-term access and authenticity. 
Using public GitHub repo documentation and web 
archive web crawls from the Internet Archive’s 
Wayback Machine (IAWM), we describe how these 
digital community archives emerged on GitHub, how 
knowledge of them circulated on other social media 
platforms and detail some strategies these volunteers 
have used to keep these community archives alive, resist 
censorship, and guard their safety through translation, 
making copies, and other reproduction strategies.  
Following on previous ethical and critical digital 
social media research published in HICSS, we seek to 
show these memory practices beginning on GitHub that 
spill over to other platforms are confrontations between 
communities and the tools they use to communicate 
information [14]. These confrontations are productive 
for digital social media scholars because they surface 
conflicting values of platforms, government interests, 
and communities seeking self-determination over 
repositories of information, accessing information 
publicly and building community archives that 
commemorate victims of the pandemic. What’s at stake 
when grassroots organizers and community archivists 
use platforms as memory infrastructures? What can we 
learn from how community archives have enrolled 
platform features into their memory practices, self-
determination efforts and community-building? After 
presenting some background literature, we briefly 
describe our methods and limits of the study, then we 
provide a statement on our research team’s positionality. 
In the fourth and fifth sections we introduce two case 
studies of Chinese community archives documenting 
COVID-19 using GitHub. The paper finishes by 
discussing the platformization of digital cultural 
memory and the need for research that examines how 
community archives are created, accessed, and impacted 
by platform features.  
2. Background literature 
2.1 Community Archives 
The GitHub repos that we researched are both 
identified as archives and community efforts at 
documenting and preserving memories of the 
coronavirus by Chinese users. In documentation and in 
news coverage of these efforts, organizers of the repos 
identify themselves as Chinese citizens who are 
concerned “volunteers”, “organizers”, and “netizens” 
committed to collecting personal accounts of their 
experiences, which in addition to the pain and trauma of 
pandemic also include censorship and threats from the 
government. As such, we take these creators’ 
identification and efforts on their own terms and 
consider these repos to be digital community archives 
that are organized and enacted on GitHub where the 
platform operates as an intermediary between users and 
third parties such as advertisers or government 
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regulators.  We argue that these COVID-19 community 
archives materialized in response to misrepresentations 
and absences of personal narratives, but also efforts to 
address health misinformation, suppression of on-the-
ground first-person accounts, and government 
censorship of online personal experiences of the 
pandemic in China. 
As people have adopted new digital technologies—
from digital cameras to email listservs and Facebook 
groups—community archives have increasingly 
leveraged digital tools on the Internet. Some initiatives 
are entirely organized and accessed via platforms like 
Instagram. Community archives are defined as non-
traditional collections and archival communities made 
up of people who are not well-documented, or not 
documented at all, by traditional cultural heritage 
institutions like archives, libraries, or museums [10]. 
The critical archival theorist Michelle Caswell has 
argued for the more precise description of “marginalised 
identity-based community archives” in order to 
distinguish from other kinds of community archives 
which may come from dominant or oppressive power 
structures that ultimately maintain their dominance 
through preservation [11, p. 23]. Thus, marginalized 
identity-based community archives are formed by 
people not only to create documentation around their 
experiences but also to counteract misrepresentations 
and dominant documentation practices.1 Crucially, for 
the COVID-19 community archives and other activists’ 
documentation efforts, GitHub is a free, open, and 
publicly available platform in China. While other US-
based platforms such as Google and Facebook are 
presently banned, many Western platforms with 
enterprise and e-commerce purposes have sought to 
grow their markets in China while maneuvering the 
Great Firewall [15].  
Researchers have observed that as community 
archive organizations have transitioned to born-digital 
records and online communication for access they 
increasingly use platforms to capture documentation 
from social media activity, circulate information 
resources, and even collaborate on writing projects [16]. 
However, many archival scholars and media studies 
researchers have examined the challenges that groups 
face when establishing digital community archives that 
reflect their values, support their needs, and protect their 
knowledge as minoritized groups [17]–[19].  Platforms 
frequently update features, policies, and affordances 
that can impact users in a variety of ways that put their 
identities, community practices, and commemoration 
with platformed content at risk [20], [21]. As such, 
digital community archives using platforms can at once 
 
1 Caswell has theorized this elsewhere as the “symbolic annihilation” 
of minoritized groups. For more see: Caswell, M. (2014). Seeing 
enact self-determination efforts while risking 
oppressive scrutiny, or even ambivalence and 




Since 2005, GitHub has operated as cloud-based 
hosting services for the Git version control system 
ensuring documentation of non-linear collaborative 
development of software [22]. “Git” is a version control 
system that offers a method of open collaboration for 
distribution enabling documentation of workflow 
through producing working copies of a repository for 
contributors and smooth merging processes. The open 
source software project has grown immensely popular, 
with a recent survey by Stack Overflow revealing that 
nearly 90% of respondents utilize Git in their coding 
process [23]. GitHub self-articulates as a space for 
developers to come together and work on code as 
reflected in the more than 100 million repositories of 
code hosted on the site [22], [24]. In 2018 Microsoft 
acquired GitHub and since then has expanded its scope, 
describing itself as an online platform for connection, 
storage, and retrieval for teams and enterprise users. 
GitHub as a platform has increasingly capitalized its 
services to private companies around the world as 
enterprise software for documentation management for 
3 million organizations. Approximately 60% of Fortune 
500 companies use GitHub for their internal 
development and documentation processes [22].  
While the platform makes money from tailored 
enterprise plans with varying capabilities for 
administrative actions, security, and support [25], there 
are many features available to users for free, allowing 
them to publish and make actions and documentation 
public on the Internet. Many thousands of individual 
users use the free version of GitHub for community-
oriented endeavors [26], and groups in China have used 
GitHub repos to organize actions and volunteer efforts 
for many years. For example, 996.ICU is a group of 
information technology workers fighting to disrupt the 
9am-9pm, 6 days per week schedule, and they use 
GitHub as a bulletin board for visibility and labor 
advocacy [27]. Because GitHub is not blocked by 
Chinese Internet service providers (ISPs), it is also used 
to document and publish content that would otherwise 
be censored and inaccessible. For more than four years, 
prominent anti-censorship repos have been utilizing 
GitHub to combat Chinese government censorship and 
advocate for free speech [28]. 
It is important to interrogate the value of such a 
platform for preservation of information as much as it 
yourself in history: community archives and the fight against 
symbolic annihilation. The Public Historian, 36(4), 26-37. 
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affords the ability to access materials that are designed 
to be openly available online. For our purposes here, its 
software documentation and versioning control features 
are of great interest to the study of community archive 
practices because they capture chains of evidence in 
metadata information about repository updates. Both 
analog and digital archiving communities believe in the 
importance of tracing and confirming provenance. In 
this regard, GitHub provides a constant chain of 
documentation on additions, changes, merges, and 
contributors. This metadata information can be 
understood as valuable contextual information and 
valuable provenance. The chain of provenance is 
continuously preserved within the structure of the 
platform and continuously produces metadata on 
changes to each line of code or other form of file. 
However, this reliable and openly accessible 
provenance information can also put users at risk of 
censorship crackdowns as part of China’s Internet 
censorship and surveillance policies. 
 
2.3 Platforms and infrastructuralization in China 
 
Scholars who research China’s Internet governance 
typically focus on techno-nationalist influences in the 
development of digital platforms, ranging from data 
flow policy and its localization regimes [29], to the 
programmability and “infrastructuralization” of 
platforms such as WeChat [30]. As a result of China’s 
Great Firewall and longstanding censorship policies 
since the establishment of ISPs [15], [31], China’s 
citizenry has practiced self-censorship in online and 
digital communications [32]. In their discussion of the 
Chinese model of platform infrastructuralization 
through Tencent’s WeChat, Plantin and de Seta 
emphasize the protectionist environment where 
platforms like Tencent and Weibo allow governmental 
control and user surveillance in an effort to become, 
essentially, public information infrastructures in China. 
US-based and European platform companies aim to 
become public information infrastructures in many 
contexts as well, but eschewing state oversight for more 
private, corporate regulatory frameworks. As Western 
platforms such as GitHub attempt assert their 
“infrastructural ambitions” in Chinese markets, 
researchers can witness the infrastructuralization of 
digital communication services such as software 
development and knowledge repositories unfold, while 
observing how foreign privatized firms like Microsoft 
must negotiate China’s techno-nationalist platform 
policies [30, p. 259]. In building on previous research 
examining Internet censorship in China and digital 
communication technologies [15], [29], [32], this study 
highlights how governments, platforms, and users can 
be at odds with the values that appear to be ‘baked in’ to 
platform features, such as public versioning, open 
access to documents, and cloning repositories. Platform 
confrontations like the ones we present here instantiate 
values while engendering power, revealing how a 
functional sovereignty is enforced by platforms as 
intermediaries of states (or alongside them) [7]. These 
confrontations can also illustrate how alternative uses of 
platform mechanisms are possible, revealing the stakes 
of platforms in and across nation states, and society. 
3. Methodology 
In this study we aim to understand how GitHub 
repositories are being used by COVID-19 interest 
groups for organizing community archives and memory 
infrastructures, while protecting their knowledge from 
government censorship. How do groups build, organize 
and provide access to their GitHub community 
archives? How do they use platform features to protect, 
preserve, and represent community documentation? In 
addressing these research questions, we show how 
public GitHub repos can be cloned, forked, and taken 
private in order to preserve personal narratives and 
counteract government censorship and health 
misinformation. Due to the sensitivity of these 
materials, we decided to only use data and repositories 
which have been already published and cited by Chinese 
and international news outlets. We primarily use 
contextual metadata from documentation describing 
each archive’s GitHub repo, and not the records that 
they have been published as some contain identifying 
information, have been since made “private” or have 
been unpublished or are likely to be taken down. While 
all these sources were publicly available online at the 
beginning of our analysis (in Spring 2020), some have 
disappeared and many more are likely to be deleted. One 
strategy that we find and report on when users copy, fork 
or clone these sources. Even as we investigate and report 
on these archival practices, we seek to protect these 
copies and clones from censorship efforts too. Unless 
Chinese and international news outlets have previously 
published these repos and usernames, we do not identify 
users in these research findings, in order to protect the 
privacy of these GitHub users and the confidentiality of 
these important repos.  
Documentation about public GitHub repos and user 
accounts are publicly available online, including 
metadata on account updates and actions. Each user 
account page contains information about the 
repositories that user has created. GitHub automatically 
generates a data visualization concerning activity in the 
form of issues and pull requests called. Contribution 
activity is also documented in the form of a timeline 
showing which commits are linked to which repository 
(Figure 1.). 
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Figure 1. Contribution activity timeline and 
visualization of a GitHub user account. 
 
The timeline feature is mirrored within each 
GitHub repo document activity. To trace the arc of these 
community archive initiatives, we analyzed existing 
repo timelines and web archives of the platform. This 
enabled consideration of the changing scope and added 
content in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and 
domestic politics. For the repos which have since been 
made private, we utilized the Internet Archive’s 
Wayback Machine web archives. Public repos on 
GitHub are frequently crawled for web archives like the 
Internet Archive, so we were able to utilize provenance 
information from the web archives of the GitHub pages 
previously operational through comparing snapshots of 
each repo’s original URL. For more on this method of 
using provenance information from IAWM web craws, 
see [33]. 
International media coverage of the public health 
crisis, COVID-19 documentation initiatives, and 
Chinese web content provided further source context for 
the climate in which these community archives projects 
operated. Further, Chinese and English social media 
posts provided reactionary commentary and personal 
insight into the status of these community archive 
projects as they emerged and were subject to censorship. 
In observing these repo actions from web archived 
URLs and comparing them to news stories and other 
social media posts published at the same time, we were 
able to construct a timeline of events, actions, and in 
some cases verified motivations from organizers 
describing these changes in repo documentation and 
 
2 Due to the nature of the documents and the context of the research, 
our research team translator wishes to remain anonymous.  
news reporting. Reading this digital evidence in concert 
enabled us to visualize and trace how two teams of 
Chinese community archivists have worked to 
document narratives concerning COVID-19 with 




It is imperative to state the limits of this research 
when observing archival practices in ‘real-time’ as 
organizers respond to government censorship and 
negotiate layers of accessibility on platforms. To avoid 
further highlighting and naming users operating in this 
vulnerable and quickly-changing context, we have 
chosen not to publish usernames or cite content we 
know remains at risk. As a result of masking sources 
(and users’ identities) that are still available online, we 
limit the primary sources and data drawn upon for 
evidence and presented to readers for verification to 
instances previously reported in media coverage.  
Translation of these sources are another limitation 
we acknowledge in this study. Both repositories 
featured some English prose in their self-written 
descriptions of identities, motivations, and archive 
content but most documents were in Mandarin Chinese. 
With the understanding that word selection in bilingual 
texts carries weight and power, a native speaker 
contributed Chinese-to-English translations of the data.2 
This research focuses on the occurrence of these 
community digital archives, and our translator 
collaborator was able to assist in translating materials 
that were key to understanding the trajectory of these 
repos and confirming semantic meanings.  
Critics of our choice to interpret archival efforts and 
memory practices so shortly after they unfolded online 
during a time of great upheaval during the pandemic 
would be right to caution their generalizability, 
especially since the end of the pandemic is yet to arrive. 
However, we believe that these findings from the 
‘beginnings’ of community documentation responses to 
the pandemic will be meaningful in future accounts and 
theories of information practices documenting the 
COVID-19 aftermath, as well as understanding the 
impact of platform affordances on minoritized 
communities, efforts at self-determination and their 
archives. 
 
3.2 Statement on our positionality  
 
We acknowledge our team positionality and our 
subjectivities as researchers as we approach the topic 
and interpret these findings. Our positionality informs 
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not only our individual perspectives, but perspectives on 
methodology and construction of the research process. 
As white, cisgender researchers, both co-authors have 
inherently benefited from the structural racism of the 
academy and the higher education landscape in the US. 
Having both been trained and working at American 
institutions, we are cognizant of the centrism of Western 
scholarship and the Euro-centric methodologies which 
inform our understanding of information studies, 
archival practices, and cultural stewardship of digital 
memory and platforms. As a result of our locations and 
institutional affiliation, we have had open Internet 
access and continue to be able to access the web with 
limited concerns for web tracing, tracking, and 
censorship. We recognize that each of these privileges 
impact our research positionality when investigating 
digital archives, community preservation, and 
information networks in China and beyond. 
4. Ensuring Access with Translations  
One COVID-19 community archive projects, 
“/nCovMemory,” in particular illustrates coordination 
and tactics that community archivists use to confront 
Chinese Internet censorship of speech in China while 
using platform features for collaboration and managing 
documentation. According to /nCovMemory repo’s 
description, the archive began collecting accounts in 
January 2020. Shortly after the first /nCovMemory repo 
was created the account’s owner, Memoryhonest 
created another repo entitled, /nCovMemory-en 
featuring English translations of the same articles 
published in the Chinese /nCovMemory repo [34].  
The repo has a document that introduces the 
purpose and motivations of the team of volunteers. 
These community archivists call themselves the Chengji 
Translation team, a small group of volunteers 
committed to remembrance through authentic 
documentation. From January to February 2020, the 
Chengji Translation Team posted English translations of 
first-hand reports from the /nCovMemory repo and 
published them to the /nCovMemory-en repo.  
US journalists interviewed the creators of the 
/nCovMemory GitHub repository and reported that a 
team of 7 volunteers had been archiving media reports, 
as well as non-fiction works, and personal narratives 
that conflicted with Chinese state media reports of the 
pandemic on the ground [35]. After the US media 
coverage of the archive project, the first-hand accounts 
and articles in Chinese as well as the English 
 
3 Repos that have been taken down, unpublished, or have gone from 
public to private each display the same ‘404 not found’ page dialog, 
so it is difficult to infer motivations without verification from the 
translations stopped being published to both GitHub 
repos.  
In April, the Chinese repo /nCovMemory began to 
display a 404 page according to archived webcrawls of 
the website from the Internet Archive’s Wayback 
Machine [36]. Concurrently, it was reported that 
organizers of similar COVID-19 community archives 
using GitHub were becoming targets of a Chinese 
government crackdown censoring accounts of the 
pandemic [35]. Some Chinese GitHub repo creators 
were arrested and put under house arrest, while others 
are reported to still be missing [37]. While the 
/nCovMemory-en English translation GitHub repo is 
still publicly available online, the Chinese language 
repo /nCovMemory has been taken down or gone 
private [38].3 However, before the Memoryhonest 
account went quiet and took down public access to the 
/nCovMemory, both the Chinese and English repos 
were downloaded and republished as cloned repos by 
other GitHub users. Such clones of the original 
/nCovMemory community archive allow those 
interested to continue to “browse [their] archives,” of 
the English translations but also access the materials 
through different copied repos, including clones that 
have now been published outside of GitHub as well. 
For the Chengji translation team, the act of 
translation ensures a broader audience, providing a 
means for more readers to witness first-hand accounts 
that are not represented currently in Chinese media 
coverage. In describing their motivations in the repo 
ReadMe and “about” section, the volunteers regard 
these acts of translation as both resistance and self-
determination in giving authentic accounts. They 
acknowledge the likelihood of the repo receiving more 
traction, longevity, audience reach and endurance of the 
materials if other versions of the Chinese collections are 
translated into English and posted in the English 
language repo. 
5. Lots of Clones Keeps Stuff Safe 
The self-articulated memory practices and 
preservation efforts guiding /nCovMemory can be 
observed across GitHub in other repos emerging in the 
early months of 2020. On February 4th, just over a week 
after Wuhan was placed under government-mandated 
quarantine [39], another repo, /wuhan2019, emerged on 
GitHub [40]. The archive’s mission was clearly 
articulated in the repository’s description, proclaiming: 
“Lest we forget this pandemic, or at least I won’t forget” 
acting as an archive for mainstream media articles that 
account holder. In this case, published interviews with the 
Memoryhonest account organizers report that they went ‘private’ in 
response to pressure from government censorship efforts.  
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organizers anticipate will be censored or removed [41]. 
As Chinese citizens began to voice concern about 
accuracy and access to information, both /nCovMemory 
and /wuhan2019 appear as community efforts to 
document mainstream narratives, facts, and figures 
relating to coronavirus and referencing each other's 
efforts, while bolstering documentation with personal 
narratives and first-hand accounts. Both scholarly media 
analysis and journalism highlighted the beginning of 
2020 as a period of increasing worry, agony, and despair 
over not only the virus but the government’s response to 
limit and censor oppositional content originating from 
China [28].  
In the context of limited access to reliable public 
health information concerning coronavirus, 
/wuhan2019 functions to document disappearing 
coronavirus information as well as misinformation 
preserving both reliable and unreliable accounts. 
Amongst the state sponsored media emerging that 
COVID-10 community archives sought to document 
using GitHub repos, the /wuhan2019 repository 
dedicates itself to preserving mainstream media articles. 
The repo contains a ReadMe file written by the creator, 
outlining the mission and introducing the trajectory of 
the initiative. It has been updated as the archive grows, 
illustrating the narrative changes and enduring 
motivations of those creating and maintaining the repos. 
The language describes a reality in which the actors 
expect all the documents hosted on the repo to “be 
erased by CCP [sic: Chinese Community Party] 
someday” [42]. In recirculating previously published 
online documents as PDF files the /wuhan2019 acts as a 
curator anticipating both a present and a future in which 
these reports will be destroyed. 
The documents are uploaded, added, and preserved 
within the /wuhan2019 repository and are grouped by 
media outlet into a folder structure of chronologically 
organized publications. The earliest article dates to late 
December 2019, and the latest commit (or version) to 
the repository on April 24th, 2020 [41]. 43 news outlets 
are represented with varying amounts of documentation 
per outlet. The outlets range from Xiao Xiang Morning 
News published in Changsha capital of China’s Hunan 
province to GQ China, a popular men’s magazine. 
Within each folder, articles are preserved as individual 
digital objects with naming conventions including date 
and article title. For example, the /wuhan2019/New 
York Times () repository hosts 319 pdfs of Chinese 
New York Times articles covering the outbreak in China 
from US perspectives that were published in the Chinese 
version of the newspaper.  
Among the documents stored in /wuhan2019 are 
internationally-recognized features on the evolution, 
ramifications, and human-toll of the virus in China and 
abroad [35]. On February 3rd, the magazine branch of 
Caixin Media published a 40,000 word cover story 
chronicling  the impact of how stalled dissemination of 
information pertaining to the virus led to the scale and 
scope of crisis within Wuhan [35]. With such a critical 
stance of local government, publishers who ran articles 
such as this assumed swift censorship, accepting the risk 
of deletion and forced edit by government censors. 
Lestweforget was then busy, locating published articles 
that would soon be destroyed or censored. 
Another genre preserved within the archive are 
diary-like first person accounts reflecting intimate 
reflections. Such was the case with the diaries of the 
writer Fang Fang—a well-known literary figure whose 
works have historically concerned the lower strata of 
society—published on social media. As noted by the 
Chinese public and international outlets, each of her 
accounts were consistently and immediately deleted by 
censors within approximately an hour [43]. /wuhan2019 
hosts 57 of Fang’s diary entries. Such personal 
testimonies like Fang Fang’s are pivotal in shaping 
understanding of the concerns and constraints which 
shaped Hubei in the context of COVID-19. Reading 
commentary allows one to understand the intrinsic 
details of events both personal and universal. These 
types of historical accounts and individual narratives of 
crises are pertinent when access to accurate information 
is inhibited or controlled by oppressive governments. As 
posed by the Chinese author and academic Yan Lianke, 
without documentation like Fang’s which digitally pens 
the experience, emotions, and socio-cultural landscape, 
“What would we have heard? What would we have 
seen?” [44]. 
The maintenance of /wuhan2019 with new, 
reputable articles before censorship edits, alterations, 
and deletion from the government continued throughout 
February, March, and the beginning of April. As the toll 
of the virus exponentially grew, so did Chinese 
censorship mechanisms. In response,  social media users 
began to use fictional languages like Klingon and 
Elvish, or emojis in their posts to try and evade censors 
using automated language identification trackers [4].  
With the disappearance of three individuals 
affiliated with another Chinese GitHub project, 
Terminus2049, and the lack of additions to 
2019nCovMemory before disappearance, the landscape 
of community archiving using Git was rapidly changing. 
On April 26th, /wuhan2019 suspended contributions 
while maintaining status as a public repository. In a 
recent update to the ReadMe, the decision to suspend 
updates to the repository came in part because the 
pandemic was showing signs of decline in China, and in 
part due to the fear of having identity disclosed and 
personal security compromised [38]. As concisely 
articulated by a GitHub user who messaged the 
repository and subsequently made public in a recent 
Page 2550
statement, “We all want to remember history, but there 
are always people who do not want us to remember” 
[38]. On June 5th, however, an update was published 
reasserting the aim of the project and calling for the 
release of the Terminus2049 contributors, and freedom 
of speech in China [45].  
6. Discussion  
Platforms like GitHub promise an easier way to 
collaborate, host information online (like code and 
documents) and share access to team projects. We see 
many of the GitHub features that support collaboration 
used in innovative ways by community archives, from 
taking a repo private to protect volunteers, to cloning or 
forking a parent repository to make public copies for 
ensuring further access. Each of these tactics can 
outmaneuver China’s Great Firewall of censoring 
speech, at least for a while. These Chinese community 
archive repos (and their clones) documenting personal 
COVID-19 experiences surface ideological differences 
between US-based platforms, the Chinese government’s 
Internet censorship efforts, and the desire of 
communities to document and share their personal 
experiences of the pandemic. For scholars concerned 
with power, access to knowledge, self-determination 
efforts through commemoration, what can we learn 
from how these community archives of personal 
COVID-19 experiences use platforms like GitHub? 
In the aftermath of earthquakes and pandemics, 
platforms like WeChat and Twitter become public 
information infrastructures that shape and are shaped by 
new information practices. Platforms have also become 
venues where communities coordinate and 
commemorate trauma, violence, and loss with 
documentation. Information historian Megan Finn, has 
shown in her work on information practices before and 
after disasters, private platforms like Facebook convene 
groups of people in novel ways with algorithms, 
location data, and affinity groups [46]. However, the 
ways in which platforms convene such publics are 
generally unknown, their mechanisms are ‘black 
boxed’, providing outsiders with low visibility into their 
construction, development, and evaluation. We can add 
another process to the black box with the COVID-19 
community archives ‘going dark’ because researchers 
have little ways of knowing when government 
censorship via takedown requests has occurred, or 
whether ISPs are blocking access to URLs if platforms 
do not publish evidence of complying with such 
requests. It is too soon to confirm whether the repos that 
went dark and are now 404s are the result of take down 
requests from government, censorship intimidation or 
police custody, or simply the chilling of publishing 
public repos.  
Whether it has been removed or gone private, the 
404 of /nCovMemory repo shows there are conflicting 
values of access, commemoration, and control over 
first-hand accounts of the coronavirus pandemic. 
Information science and STS scholars have examined 
the epistemic tensions that platforms represent when 
they are used as infrastructures to preserve heritage, 
document evidence, or to commemorate people we’ve 
lost [9], [21]. By specifically examining platform 
developments where data stewardship and digital 
preservation strategies are enacted by users of 
platforms, we can more fully understand the impact of  
platformization on our digital cultural memory and the 
future of archives [12].  
These platform accounts also reveal the power of 
governance, sovereignty, and state censorship 
campaigns in and through features like public repos over 
digital cultural memory. The /wuhan2019 repo provides 
a lens for considering how, in an effort to combat 
censored news narratives, repo creators become 
historical curators of both COVID-19 accounts and 
subject to censorship themselves as platform users. In 
making commits and changes to the archive to protect 
these collected contributions, the contributor to 
/wuhan2019 authoritatively appraises the changing 
informational landscape and government suppression of 
health information in the media. On March 17, 2020, 
Lestweforget issued an update to /wuhan2019 noting the 
suspended additions of two media outlets coverage of 
the novel coronavirus. The commit described that due to 
the “quality” of the articles being published, items from 
China Business News and Xinmin Weekly would be 
stopped being included [45]. The /wuhan2019 repo 
updates consequently serve as records of reputability or 
lack thereof, and the performative (and powerful) 
actions of contributing to community archives. With a 
public repository, user activity of the creator and those 
participating in community archiving efforts are 
represented in the form of public notification and digital 
records.  
Like the /nCovMemory repo, /wuhan2019 attempts 
to depict the realities of lived experience of coronavirus 
in Wuhan, Hubei province, and beyond. In contrast to a 
cultural landscape where narratives of experience were 
being erased by censorship and distorting societal 
representation and collective memory, Lestweforget 
contends the “INTERNET never forgets” [40]. The 
feelings and ideals motivating both COVID-19 
community archives’ repos are facing the confrontation 
between memory, state oppression, and access to 
information within platforms and across them. With 
community archives like /wuhan 2019 and 
/nCovMemory, we conclude by asking ourselves if 
platforms are being used as community archives, what 
can platforms learn from users that leverage GitHub’s 
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features for connecting communities to information 
resources and knowledge by usurping Chinese Internet 
policy with a US-based platform?  
7. Conclusion  
We began this research to investigate platform 
dynamics in relation to memory practices and 
community archives.4 By examining how GitHub is 
being used by volunteers for organizing COVID-19 
community archives, we are able to show how platform 
affordances can be used to evade suppression of Chinese 
content published online with team translation 
organizing, cloning, and migrating content. Each of 
these emerging and innovative community archive 
practices uses code, documentation, and software 
repository features appear to be new strategies of 
memory and resistance using the GitHub platform. But, 
as the disappeared repos illustrate, China continues to 
suppress personal narratives and media coverage of the 
coronavirus pandemic. Platforms, like GitHub, can 
leveraged to extend suppression by putting users and 
their publicly available content at risk because 
governments can be users of platforms too.  
Whether enforcing the power of states, disciplining 
bodies through institutions, or building counter-
narratives that resist hegemony, archives have always 
been implicated in projects of domination. Researchers 
of digital cultural memory should pay attention to the 
platformization of memory practices and community 
archives. These confrontations over accessing personal 
accounts of the pandemic in China by organizing 
community archives on GitHub remind us again that it 
remains to be seen where platforms see themselves in 
this struggle over what will be remembered and what 
we’ll sooner forget.  
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